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This paper uses a two-country, computable general equilibrium (CGE), trade model to analyze
the impact on Mexico and the U.S. of the precipitous peso depreciation in late 1994 and early
1995, and of the policy response to the crisis.  The model includes explicit treatment of
agricultural policies in the two countries, and of labor-market linkages, including rural-urban
migration within Mexico and Mexico-U.S. migration.   We explore “hard,” “medium,” and
“soft” landing scenarios, which differ in the extent of assumed unemployment and fall in
capacity utilization, and in the nature of the structural adjustment program in Mexico.  For each
scenario, we consider a range of balance-of-trade adjustments, and resulting changes in the
equilibrium real exchange rate.  The results indicate that both countries benefit from Mexico
achieving a soft landing.  It is important to achieve a new equilibrium exchange rate quickly, and
overshooting is costly for both countries.  The hard landing leads to major disruption of the
Mexican economy and greatly increased migration to the U.S., while a soft landing yields very
little additional migration.  The structural adjustment program is good for Mexican agriculture,
shifting resources into high productivity tradables such as fruits and vegetables.  A protectionist
U.S. response to the increase in Mexican exports hinders the structural adjustment process and
leads to increased Mexico-U.S. migration. 
Revised version of a paper presented at the Plenary Conference of the North
American Agricultural Policy Research Consortium, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA, May 5–6, 1995.  Conference title: “Towards a Continental
Agricultural Policy.” 1
1. Introduction
For the past few years, Mexico has benefited from large inflows of short-term foreign
capital.  It has been widely recognized that these large annual flows were unsustainable in the
longer run.  Furthermore, the resulting appreciation of the peso was actually hindering the
desirable changes in trade structure that have been underway since the mid-1980's and should
continue under NAFTA.  The question was not whether there would be a real depreciation, but
how smoothly and over what time period. In December 1994, Mexico was forced to float the
exchange rate.  There was a precipitous depreciation accompanied by short-term capital flight. 
The question now is how will the economy adjust?  Will Mexico have a “hard landing” similar to
their experience in the early 1980s, with major unemployment, declines in capacity utilization,
and increased migration to the U.S.?  Or, with appropriate policies, can they achieve a “soft
landing,” making the needed adjustments without serious disruption of the economy or increased
migration? 
NAFTA, which started in January 1994, should greatly facilitate the needed adjustments
in trade by gradually lowering barriers to Mexican exports to the U.S. and Canada.  In addition,
Mexico has adopted a stabilization package, including tightened government spending and
monetary policies, salary limitations, and some expansion of privatization.  The Mexican
program is intended to reassert macro control, limit the inflationary impact of the depreciation,
restore investor confidence, and so support the structural changes that are underway.  Indeed, the
structural adjustment program now being implemented can be seen as accelerating trends toward
North American integration that were underway under the liberalization program that started in
the mid-1980s, and that were further facilitated by the creation of NAFTA. 
Strong trade, capital market, and migration links between the U.S. and Mexico give the
U.S. a special interest in Mexico's ability to achieve a soft landing.  These links also offer a
conduit through which U.S. policies with respect to the peso crisis can significantly influence
Mexico's ability to avoid a hard landing.  For example, U.S. agricultural policies will have an
important role in shaping Mexican adjustment through their effects on Mexican farm export
growth, on rural labor demand, and, consequently, on migration.  About one-quarter of Mexico's
labor force is employed in agriculture, and these rural workers are the source of labor migration
to urban Mexico and the U.S.  Under a soft landing, the depreciation and concomitant structural
adjustment should stimulate agricultural exports, resource shifts within agriculture,  and rural
labor demand, and so help reduce migration pressure.  A hard landing, with declines in capacity
utilization and employment, and perhaps increased barriers to exports into the U.S., will generate
costly and disruptive labor migration flows.  It is important that the two countries coordinate
their policy responses, taking into account the high degree of integration of their product and
factor markets. 
In this paper, we analyze the role of Mexican and U.S. policies in supporting Mexico to
achieve a soft landing.  We utilize a computable general equilibrium trade model of the U.S. and
Mexico to compare the effects of the Mexican crisis under alternative policy scenarios.  We
consider various hard and soft landing scenarios, and consider the potential role of U.S. policy      Provisions of the NAFTA agreement are summarized in Congressional Budget Office (1993). 
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reactions, especially in agriculture.  In the next section, we describe current agricultural and trade
policies, particularly the recent developments under NAFTA and PROCAMPO.  In section three,
we describe the model.  In sections four and five, we describe the scenarios and present model
results.  Our conclusions are in section six. 
2. Recent Developments in Agricultural Policies
There are two recent major developments in agricultural policy in the U.S. and Mexico. 
One is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), implemented in January 1994.  The
second is PROCAMPO, Mexico's new farm support program announced in October 1993.
NAFTA
The NAFTA agreement in agriculture provides for immediate elimination of tariffs and
other restrictions for many commodities — most of them already duty free or subject to low
tariffs.   For certain other products, a 5-to-10 year phase-out period is permitted.  A few
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commodities are subject to a 15-year phase out of trade barriers.  In the U.S., these include
selected fruits and vegetables.  In Mexico, they are dry beans, corn, dry milk, orange juice, and
sugar.  A ten-year phase-out of trade barriers is specified for Mexico's imports of rice, wheat,
soybeans, poultry, and selected horticultural crops, and for U.S. imports of rice, wheat, dairy
products, and some horticulture. 
All quotas are converted immediately to tariff rate quotas (TRQs).  There are two
alternative treatments of the TRQ’s over time.  First, for those commodities protected by import
quotas prior to the NAFTA, a duty free import quantity is permitted immediately, to be increased
annually based on a 3 percent compound annual growth rate in quantity.  Within-quota imports
are subject to preferential tariffs established under NAFTA, to be phased out over 10–15 years. 
Over-quota amounts are subject to tariffs set to match current levels of non-tariff protection. 
Commodities with this TRQ treatment include U.S. imports of peanuts and sugar, and Mexican
imports of dry beans, corn, and dry milk.  
Second, for some sensitive commodities protected by tariffs prior to NAFTA, TRQs are
introduced as a safety provision to prevent import surges.  Within-quota quantities are to be
increased at a 3 percent compound rate over 10 years.  For imports above that quantity, tariffs
could be imposed, to be eliminated (not phased out) at the end of 10 years.  The tariff rate is not
to exceed the lower of the most-favored nation (MFN) rate as of July 1991 or the prevailing
MFN rate.  For the U.S., this “snap-back” provision applies to selected horticultural imports.  For
Mexico, this treatment covers imports of swine, pork, apples, potatoes and coffee products.  
An important determinant of the landing conditions for Mexico will be the willingness of3
the U.S. to accept higher levels of horticultural imports from Mexico as the peso depreciates,
despite the right it has preserved under NAFTA for “snap-back” protection.  Effects of a snap-
back would be significant for the Mexican economy because horticulture is the main potential
source for expanded Mexican farm exports, and because labor migration flows to the U.S. are
highly sensitive to employment conditions in rural Mexico.   
PROCAMPO
In the past, Mexico supported its agriculture through an extensive and complex system of
subsidized inputs, guaranteed prices, subsidized retail food sales, and high import barriers. 
Mexico's accession to NAFTA meant that import barriers could no longer be used as its main
instrument of farm support.  Yet, because of the large proportion of Mexican labor employed in
farming, the immediate exposure of agriculture to market forces was undesirable.  In response,
Mexico adopted PROCAMPO, a program that transforms farm support from a program based
mainly on import protection to a program of fixed, direct payments to farm households. The
intent of PROCAMPO is to provide temporary support to agriculture, helping to maintain farm
income while giving NAFTA time to stimulate agricultural exports and nonagricultural labor
demand. 
PROCAMPO provides direct income support payments based on historical acreage
planted to eligible crops, including corn, beans, wheat, cotton, safflower, soybeans, sorghum,
rice, and barley.  It is designed to be a 15-year transitional support program, providing fixed real
payments for ten years, with a gradual phasing out of payments in years 11 through 15.  By
providing direct payments, the program decouples support from output decisions, permitting the
sectoral composition of Mexican agriculture to respond to world price signals throughout the
duration of PROCAMPO.  In contrast to a system of import protection, the PROCAMPO farm
support program requires large fiscal expenditures.  
Fiscal austerity under the structural adjustment program may affect Mexico's ability to
maintain PROCAMPO payments.  On the other hand, the depreciation will lead to increased
domestic agricultural prices, import substitution, and export expansion, accelerating the
agricultural adjustments already underway.  Agriculture will benefit from these changes, which
may obviate the original need for PROCAMPO.  These issues are explored in the empirical
analysis below. 
3. The NAFTA-CGE Model
The U.S.-Mexico model links two single-country, 29-sector, computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models through commodity trade and labor migration.  The model focuses on
sectoral resource allocation, production, and trade flows.  The model emphasizes agriculture and
includes an explicit modeling of agricultural programs (including trade policies) in both
countries.  The model solves for relative prices, wages, and the real exchange rates that
equilibrate product markets, factor markets, and the balance of trade in the two countries.  The      The model is documented in Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (1992).  Our treatment of labor migration is
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described more fully in Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (1994).  The data base is documented in Burfisher,
Thierfelder, and Hanson (1992).
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model is documented in detail elsewhere, and we describe here only our treatment of agricultural
policies, labor migration, and macro closure.  
2
Agricultural Policies
Agricultural policies are modeled either as price wedges, which affect output decisions,
or lump-sum income transfers.  The wedges and transfers are either specified exogenously or
determined endogenously, based on the institutional characteristics of the program being
modeled.  The Mexican agricultural policies that we model are PROCAMPO and the low-income
tortilla subsidy, which operates as a kind of food stamp program.  Both programs are modeled as
transfer payments to households, which do not distort production decision.  Costs of both
programs enter into Mexican agricultural program expenditures.  
For the U.S., we model the deficiency payment program and the Export Enhancement
Program (EEP).  Deficiency payments are based on fixed acreage and yield times the difference
between a target price and the market price for each program crop.  In the model, the payment
rate is solved endogenously as the difference between the fixed target price and the solution
market price.  The EEP program is treated as an ad valorem export subsidy.  The subsidy rate is
applied as a mark-up on the world export price, which allows U.S. producers to lower the world
price of their goods relative to other suppliers, while maintaining their received price.  Total
expenditures on deficiency payments and  EEP expenditures are included in U.S. farm program
expenditures.
In both countries, the tariff equivalents of import quotas are modeled endogenously.  The
initial tariff equivalent is  calculated as the “price-gap” between the world price and the domestic
price.  The quota's ad valorem equivalent (and hence the value to license holders of the import
premia) changes with the price gap.  Premium income from each sector is retained domestically
and distributed to the holders of import licenses.  Tariffs are modeled with fixed ad valorem
rates, and tariff revenues are paid by consumers to the government.
The model also incorporates indirect taxes, value-added taxes (in Mexico), social security
taxes, income taxes, and enterprise taxes.  These policies, together with distortions in base
sectoral factor returns and differences in production technologies, create a second-best
environment for policy experiments.  
Labor Migration
The model specifies three migration flows: rural Mexico to rural U.S. labor markets,






      Lozano (1993) suggests that 15-20 percent of migrant income is remitted.  We assume a remittance rate of 20 percent. 
3
Sensitivity analysis indicates that the impact of changes in the exchange rate on migration is very sensitive to the assumed
rate. 
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Mexico from rural to unskilled urban labor markets.  Labor migration is assumed to adjust to
maintain the existing wage differentials between the two countries. 
In equilibrium, migration levels are determined which maintain a specified ratio of real
wages, wgdf , for each labor category in the two countries, measured in a common currency, mig
and a specified ratio of real wages between the rural and unskilled urban markets in Mexico.  The
international migration equation is:
where the index mig refers to the three migration flows, WF is the wage, EXR is the solution
equilibrium exchange rate, and EXR0 is the base year exchange rate.  Migrants' sensitivity to 
exchange rate changes is described by s, the share of earnings remitted.   In the internal migration
3
equation for Mexico, rural and urban workers compare wages within Mexico, and there is no
exchange rate effect.  For rural workers in Mexico, the average wage in the migration decision
includes a share of land rental income and a share of direct payments.  The domestic labor supply
in each skill category in each country is adjusted by the migrant labor flow. 
  
There are several implications of this specification of migration.  One is that Mexican-
U.S. migration is assumed to be sensitive to changes in the exchange rate.  Insofar as potential
migrants plan to remit part of their earnings back home,  peso depreciation makes migration
more desirable since the dollars earned in the U.S. are worth more to their families in pesos back
in Mexico. It is also the case that when s is nonzero, and exchange rate changes affect the 
migrant's decisions,  real wages can grow at different rates measured in the domestic currency. 
As the remittance share rises, in situations where the exchange rate changes,  it is likely that
migration will be observed from a labor market where the real wage is rising to one where it is
falling, measured in terms of domestic prices. 
Another implication of the migration specification is that, since a share of direct
payments  is assumed to enter the rural wage, PROCAMPO payments are assumed to influence
the migration decision.  In fact, the likely effects of PROCAMPO on  migration are not easily
determined.  Since the program payments are based on historical acreage, they will appear as
lump-sum payments to households.  They will raise farm household income, but may have no
direct effect on the decision to migrate, if potential migrants look only at returns at the margin. 
PROCAMPO could even increase migration by providing an assured source of income that
enables workers to undertake the fixed costs of  a move to urban Mexico or the U.S.  Alternative-
ly, rural households might view the payments as a wage supplement, enabling them to stay in
agriculture despite falling wages under some shock.   In Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder
(1994), we explore the sensitivity of migration and agricultural output changes  to  alternative
views on farmers' reactions to the income transfer.  In this paper, we assume a that a fixed share      Enterprise savings rates are assumed to adjust to achieve the necessary level of aggregate savings in each country. 
4
6
of direct payments affects the migration decision through its inclusion in the computation of the
rural wage. 
Finally, migration flows generated by the model refer to changes in migration from a base
of zero.  They should be seen as additional migration flows due to the policy change, adding to
current flows. 
Macro Closure
There are three key macro balances in each country model: the government deficit, aggre-
gate investment (and savings), and the balance of trade.  Government savings is the difference
between revenue and spending, with aggregate real spending fixed exogenously but revenue
depending on a variety of tax instruments.  The government deficit is therefore determined
endogenously.  Aggregate investment is determined as a fixed share of GDP, and aggregate
private savings is determined residually to achieve savings-investment balance.   The balance of
4
trade for each country (and hence foreign savings) is set exogenously, valued in world prices. 
 
Each country model solves for relative domestic prices and factor returns that clear the
factor and product markets, and for an equilibrium real exchange rate given the exogenous aggre-
gate balance of trade in each country.  A domestic price index defines the numeraire in each
country model, and the currency of the rest of the world defines the international numeraire.  The
model determines two equilibrium real exchange rates, one each for the U.S. and Mexico, which
are measured with respect to the rest of the world.  The cross rate (U.S. to Mexico) is implicitly
determined by an arbitrage condition.  For each country, the model incorporates a functional link
between the balance of trade and the real exchange rate.  Depreciation of the real exchange rate
can be simulated by reducing the exogenous balance of trade (exports minus imports). 
The model is neoclassical, focusing on changes in relative prices and changes in the struc-
ture of employment, production, and trade.  All factors are intersectorally mobile, and can be
moved around with no adjustment costs or “frictional” unemployment.  The major macro
balances are treated as essentially exogenous.  The macroeconomics is neoclassical, not
Keynesian: full employment, no adjustment costs, and government borrowing that accommodates
fixed real expenditure and endogenous changes in tax revenues without inflationary
repercussions.  In this type of model, any macroeconomic adjustment costs arising from some
shock must be specified exogenously.  Changes in capacity utilization, aggregate employment,
government expenditure, investment, and the balance of trade that are the building blocks of
macro adjustment scenarios can be imposed on the model.       Since the model is based on 1988 data and the changes in the balance of trade are in current dollars, we deflate the
5
increments to put them in 1988 prices (dividing by 1.27). 
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Figure 1: Mexican Commodity Trade Flows
Hard landing For each $5 billion improvement in trade balance: capacity
utilization and aggregate employment are reduced by 1.5%;
government expenditure is reduced by 2.0%; and the investment
rate is reduced by 1 percentage point. 
Medium landing For each $5 billion improvement in trade balance: capacity
utilization and aggregate employment are reduced by 1.0%;
government expenditure is reduced by 1.5%; and the investment
rate is reduced by 1 percentage point. 
Soft landing For each $5 billion improvement in trade balance: no change in
capacity utilization or aggregate employment; government
expenditure is reduced by 1.0%; and the investment rate is reduced
by 0.65 percentage points. 
Table 1: Adjustment Scenarios
4.  Alternative Adjustment Scenarios
We analyze three adjustment scenarios. 
For each scenario, we do five experiments, in-
creasing the balance of trade (exports minus im-
ports)  in $5 billion increments to a final amount
of $25 billion.   Figure 1 provides data on mer-
5
chandise trade for Mexico (in current dollars) and
the trade balance since 1980.  The adjustment
during the crisis in the early 1980s led to a $15
billion swing in the trade balance.  The decline in
the merchandise trade balance after 1986 is dra-
matic, and the deficit of around $20 billion in
1992-1993 is a record low.   Considering the his-
torical experience, the specification in the experi-
ments of a swing of $5–25 billion should
certainly bracket the likely range of required adjustment in the trade balance. 
In all three scenarios, we assume that NAFTA and PROCAMPO are largely in effect, so
that model results reflect changes from an equilibrium in which the two programs are
operational.  All bilateral trade barriers are removed except on those Mexican commodities
permitted a 15-year phase out.  For Mexico, these are corn, beans, and milk products.  For the
U.S.,  we assume no horticultural import tariffs, despite some 15-year TRQ protection permitted
under NAFTA.  We treat TRQ rates for Mexico and the U.S. differently because initial within-      See Sachs et al. for a macro perspective on the Mexican crisis. 
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Figure 2: Mexican Exchange Rate
Depreciation
quota amounts specified by the U.S. in the
NAFTA agreement far exceed current import
levels.  In Mexico, on the other hand, initial
within-quota amounts were generally already at
or below average current import quantities (CBO,
1993). 
The three scenarios are described in Table
1.  The first two scenarios include declines in
capacity utilization and aggregate employment,
reflecting the view that macro adjustment will
disrupt the economy and lead to a decline in
GDP, even over the medium run.  The third “soft
landing” scenario assumes no lasting adjustment
problems.  In this view, the economy is able to
undergo rapid and successful structural adjust-
ment, and the scenario reflects a snapshot of the
economy once full employment is restored. 
All three scenarios involve a decrease in absorption (total domestic demand, which equals
GDP plus imports minus exports), as the economy must adjust to higher exports and lower
imports.  We specify the macro adjustment to the absorption decline exogenously, spreading the
decline among government expenditure, investment, and consumption.  Aggregate investment is
assumed to decline the most.  There is a smaller percentage decline in government expenditure,
and aggregate consumption declines somewhat less in percentage terms than total absorption. 
5.  Empirical Results
Macroeconomic Effects
In the three scenarios, the impact of changes in the balance of trade on the Mexican real
exchange rate are very close.  The results are shown in Figure 2.  The relationship is virtually
linear, with a $1 billion improvement in the trade balance requiring about a percentage point
depreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate.  Based on “fundamentals” — import demand
and export supply functions — the panic Mexican depreciation of more than 40 percent signifi-
cantly overshoots the new equilibrium real exchange rate, assuming no change in inflation. The
CGE model is not a macro model and cannot be used to determine a “sustainable” or “equilib-
rium” balance of trade.  Given the underlying strengths of the Mexican economy, however, it is
highly unlikely that Mexico will have to adjust to a sustained annual improvement in the balance
of trade of $20–25 billion — $10–15 billion is far more likely, which implies a required depre-
ciation of 10–15 percent.  
6      Since aggregate base exports are lower than base imports, percent changes for exports will be larger than for imports
7
because the denominators are different, even with no change in the trade balance. 
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Figure 3: Mexican GDP Changes Figure 4: Mexican Absorption Changes
Figures 3 and 4 show the different effects of the three scenarios on GDP and aggregate
absorption.  The hard and medium landing scenarios involve significant declines in GDP, given
the exogenously specified unemployment and decline in capacity utilization.  The soft landing
generates increases in GDP, which reflects the shift of resources into tradable sectors where pro-
ductivity is higher.  The structural adjustment process generated by the depreciation essentially
speeds up trends initiated by the opening up of the Mexican economy in the mid-1980s and
continued through the creation of NAFTA.  In all scenarios, aggregate absorption declines.  Even
in  the soft landing, the decline in absorption due to the improvement in the trade balance more
than offsets the increase in GDP.  While structural adjustment is beneficial, it must be undertaken
in an environment of decreasing real incomes, which exacerbates the social and political stresses
that are part of the process in the best of circumstances. 
A large real depreciation has a major impact on U.S.-Mexican trade, significantly cutting
U.S. exports to Mexico and increasing Mexican exports to the U.S. (Figure 5).  In percent terms,
real Mexican exports rise more than real imports fall.  Intermediate and capital good imports into
Mexico have low substitution elasticities with domestic goods (and hence low price elasticities of
demand).  In essence, Mexico has to increase exports in order to maintain imports of crucial
goods.  There is also a terms of trade loss, as Mexico faces downward sloping demand curves in
the U.S. for its exports and upward sloping U.S. supply curves for its imports.  
7
The final equilibrium of the economy is certainly responsive to changes in the real ex-
change rate.  The model assumes that producers view the price changes as long lasting.  Any




Figure 5: Mexican Real Trade With U.S. Figure 6: Mexico-U.S. Migration
how long lasting are the changes, and will be uncertain in their responses.  It is important to give
producers the correct price signals, since too rapid or too much structural adjustment is difficult
and costly, on both sides of the border.  The danger from overshooting is that too much
depreciation will greatly, and unnecessarily, disrupt U.S.-Mexico trade.  Any policies — such as
the U.S.-led credit guarantee program — that facilitate the rapid establishment of the new long
run equilibrium exchange rate greatly benefit both Mexico and the U.S. 
Migration
Figure 6 shows the effects of the Mexican crisis on Mexican migration to the U.S. under
the three scenarios.  Three major forces determine the changes in  migration flows.  First, depre-
ciation leads to structural adjustment in Mexico, generating increased exports, lower imports, and
changes in production structure.  These changes are productivity enhancing and labor demanding,
and would normally reduce migration pressure.   Second, depreciation has a direct effect on mi-
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gration, making wages denominated in dollars more attractive to potential migrants who want to
remit income.  Finally, declining GDP and absorption exert downward pressure on real wages
and incomes in Mexico, encouraging migration. 
The hard and medium landing scenarios generate major increases in migration, peaking at
772,000 in the worst hard landing experiment.  Three forces are at work.  First, changes in the
exchange rate have a direct effect on migration.  Second, the fall in GDP (in the hard and
medium scenarios) and the change in the trade balance (in all three) cause absorption to fall,
lowering Mexican incomes and encouraging migration.  Finally, structural adjustment leads to
increased exports and import substitution, which increases efficiency and labor demand,      Sensitivity analysis indicates that this result is very sensitive to the remittance parameter, s.  Lowering s generates a
9
U-shaped migration response in the soft landing scenario, with migration turning negative as the structural adjustment
effect dominates. 
11
discouraging migration.  In the soft landing scenario, GDP increases and the structural
adjustment effects largely offset the direct effects of depreciation and the fall in absorption, and
migration increases only slightly.   The effects of structural adjustment on migration are
9
important and depend critically on what happens within Mexican agriculture, since rural-urban
migration within Mexico has a domino effect on Mexican-U.S. migration. 
Adjustment and Mexican Agriculture
The agriculture sector is especially sensitive to the effects of the Mexican crisis.  Table 2
provides data on the structure of Mexican crop production  and their dependence on trade.  Fruits
and vegetables is a large sector and is very dependent on exports, mostly to the U.S.  The other
sectors are more import dependent, especially oilseeds (a heterogeneous sector, with both high
exports and imports).
Table 2: Structure of Mexican Crops
Composition (%): Ratios: (%):
Output Exports Imports output supply
Exports/ Imports/
Cotton 0.8 0.0 2.0 0.0 26.4
Food grain 6.3 0.4 10.7 1.0 19.1
Food corn 16.6 0.0 24.1 0.0 16.8
Feed grain 19.2 0.1 16.0 0.0 10.4
Fruits/vegetables 20.1 67.3 0.9 46.8 1.1
Beans 4.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 13.4
Oilseeds 1.6 2.0 34.8 17.8 78.6
Other agriculture 31.5 30.1 6.9 13.4 3.4
Total/average 100.0 100.0 100.0 14.0 13.9
Note: The data refer to 1988 peso values.  “Supply” is output plus imports minus
exports. 
Source: Burfisher, Thierfelder, and Hanson (1992)
   Table 3 provides data on the allocation of labor and of irrigated and non-irrigated land
in the crop sectors.  Food corn is very important, using a lot of labor, over half the unirrigated
land, and a quarter of the irrigated land.  Corn and beans are the most labor intensive crops. 
Fruits and vegetables are also important, using a lot of irrigated land and with a relatively high
ratio of irrigated to unirrigated land.  In the model, we assume that the two types of land are
relatively substitutable in producing grains, but not in producing fruits and vegetables.  Thus, any
expansion of fruit/vegetable production requires diverting irrigated land away from other crops. 12
Figure 7: Mexican Agricultural Production,
Medium Landing
Figure 8: Returns to Land in Mexico,
Medium Landing
Table 3: Land and Labor Use in Mexican Agriculture
Labor Land (1,000 hectares): Labor Land shares (%)
Sector (1000s) Irrigated Unirrigated shares (%) Irrigated Unirrigated
Cotton 43 100 47 1.0 2.6 0.4
Food grain  306 735 303 7.0 19.3 2.7
Food corn 1915 887 5619 43.7 23.3 50.7
Feed grain 679 629 1678 15.5 16.5 15.1
Fruits/vegetables 299 571 446 6.8 15.0 4.0
Beans 572 237 1710 13.1 6.2 15.4
Oilseeds 128 236 197 2.9 6.2 1.8
Other agriculture 438 406 1082 10.0 10.7 9.8
Total 4380 3801 11082 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: The data refer to 1988.
Source: Burfisher, Thierfelder, and Hanson (1992). 
Figure 7 shows the changes in crop production in the medium landing scenario.  The
other scenarios show similar changes.  The depreciation generates dramatic increases in the pro-
duction of tradable crops — oilseeds and fruits/vegetables.  Oilseeds is a small sector, but has a
very high import share, with much scope for import substitution.  Fruits/vegetables is an export
sector, and exports increase dramatically in all scenarios.  In the medium landing scenario, as the
trade balance is incrementally improved, fruits/vegetables exports rise 14–97 percent and output
increases 5–34 percent.  Production of both corn and beans declines slightly, as the other sectors
bid resources away from them. 
Figure 8 shows what happens to the returns to land in the medium landing scenario (the
results are similar for the other two scenarios).  The value of both types of land increases      See Josling (1992) and Cook et al.  (1991) for a discussion of the problems and prospects facing Mexico in
10
expanding exports of fruits and vegetables to the U.S. 
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Figure 9: Mexico-U.S. Migration and U.S.
Tariffs
significantly, indicating that agriculture in
Mexico is tradable and benefits from
depreciation.   Irrigated land becomes relatively
more valuable, as the expansion of fruits and
vegetables, which is relatively intensive in
irrigated land, draws land away from corn and
bean production. 
The changes in land values in Mexico
under the adjustment program brings into
question a major assumption underlying the
PROCAMPO program.  It was assumed that
reform of Mexican agricultural policies,
removing protection and input subsidies, would
depress land values and rural incomes.  The
PROCAMPO program was designed to
compensate farmers during a 15-year transition
period for the decrease in the value of their land.  However, the adjustment program now
underway will increase land values, especially irrigated land.  It is probably desirable to rethink
the PROCAMPO program, especially given the need for Mexico to cut government expenditures. 
There is less need to compensate landowners, and much more need to facilitate changes in
cropping patterns and marketing to take advantage of the opportunities generated by the deprecia-
tion.  For example, rapid expansion of exports of fruits and vegetables requires very different
marketing methods, storage facilities, and modes of transportation, compared to other crops.  
10
There are important roles for government in expanding investment in rural infrastructure to
support expansion of agricultural exports.  The Mexican government needs to reexamine its pri-
orities in its agricultural programs in light of the changed circumstances. 
The net effect of the structural changes in agriculture is to increase the demand for labor. 
Corn, which is very labor intensive, does not decline much and the tradable sectors expand great-
ly.  The large migration effects in the hard and medium landing scenarios arise from the impact
of GDP declines, which affect the urban sectors the most.  The increase in labor demand by the
agricultural sectors generates urban-rural migration (or, in a dynamic setting, less rural-urban
migration pressure) within Mexico. 
Effect of U.S. Protection in Fruits and Vegetables
The depreciation of the Mexican exchange rate leads to dramatic expansion of Mexican
production and exports of fruits and vegetables.  The Mexicans significantly increase their share
of the U.S. market.  What would happen if the U.S. responded by instituting tariffs against14
Figure 10: Change in U.S. Deficiency
Payments
Mexican fruits and vegetables?  To explore this
question, we repeat the medium landing experi-
ments, assuming that the U.S. raises its tariff
against Mexican fruits/vegetables from zero to 25
percent, in a series of 5 percent steps that parallel
the changes in the balance of trade.  At the higher
end, these rates are above those allowed under the
“snap-back” provisions of NAFTA.  This level of
tariff protection essentially offsets the exchange
rate depreciation and eliminates the Mexican
export growth in this sector that would have
otherwise occurred.  In the absence of export
growth to the U.S., output growth is also very
small, ranging from 0.2 to 3.8 percent as the
balance of trade varies. 
With little growth in fruits/vegetables out-
put, there is a significant increase in migration pressure (Figure 9).  When the U.S. imposes
tariffs against Mexican fruits and vegetables, migration increases by from 20 to 150 thousand,
depending on the change in the balance of trade.  The result is a policy dilemma for the U.S. —
increased protection for domestic farmers leads to increased migration from Mexico. 
U.S. Farm Program Costs
Mexican adjustment involves decreases in agricultural imports from the U.S., which are
mostly program crops (Table 2).  While there will be some diversion of U.S. exports to other
markets, the result will be some downward pressure on U.S. prices.  Given that U.S. deficiency
program payments depend on the gap between market and target prices, the result will be to
increase the deficiency payments.  The effects are shown in Figure 10. 
Assuming a $25 billion swing in Mexico’s trade balance, the cost of the deficiency pay-
ment program increases from 2.0 to 3.2 percent, depending on the scenario.  Assuming that the
program costs about $10 billion, the increases amount to $200 to $320 million.  In addition, the
diversion of agricultural exports away from Mexico to other countries might well lead to in-
creased cost of the Export Enhancement Program (EEP), as the U.S. seeks to maintain export
market shares.  These cost increases provide additional reasons for the U.S. to support Mexico’s
efforts to achieve a soft landing. 15
6. Conclusion
There are a number of conclusions and  policy implications for both Mexico and the U.S. that
arise from our empirical analysis. 
C The structural adjustment process can be seen as an acceleration of beneficial trends that were
occurring under NAFTA.  Both the U.S. and Mexico gain from increased trade in both direc-
tions, and migration pressure is reduced. 
C The danger, however, is that the economy will not be able to adjust quickly enough and that
the resulting macro instability will lead to inflation and unemployment.  A hard landing
exacerbates migration pressure and undermines the needed structural changes. 
C Successful structural adjustment lessens migration pressure, partly offsetting the direct effect
of exchange rate depreciation.  The net effect is that a soft landing leads to only a moderate
increase in migration pressure. 
C Given underlying import demand and export supply functions, the initial crisis depreciation
of the Mexican peso is much more than needed to re-establish equilibrium in the sustainable
balance of trade, assuming that Mexico controls inflationary pressures and panic capital flight
is arrested. 
C Both countries will benefit from quickly establishing a new equilibrium real exchange rate,
which will minimize trade disruption and the potential impact of depreciation on migration. 
C Agriculture plays a key role in Mexico's structural adjustment.  Export growth in relatively
high productivity sectors such as fruits and vegetables will “pull” resources, especially irri-
gated land, out of corn and beans.  Agriculture gains from the depreciation and structural
adjustment, increasing labor demand and slowing rural-urban migration.  In turn, this reduces
the pressures in Mexico's urban labor markets and reduces migration pressure to the U.S.
C Mexican adjustment has agricultural policy implications for both countries.  For Mexico, the
acceleration of structural changes and efficiency gains in agriculture increase land values and
alleviate the need for transitional payments to landowners under PROCAMPO.  Structural
adjustment should provide Mexico the flexibility to reevaluate its agricultural policy,
enabling a shift from income support to rural investment that will support the needed
structural changes and facilitate increased exports. 
C For the U.S., maintaining open import markets is important to support Mexican adjustment. 
This is particularly true for fruits and vegetables, but also relevant for manufacturing.  The
policy dilemma for the U.S. is that any attempt to increase protection for U.S. farmers in
response to increased Mexican exports will significantly increase migration pressure. 16
The Mexican and U.S. economies have become increasingly integrated, in factor markets
as well as product markets.  NAFTA can be seen as validating past trends and encouraging closer
integration in the future, as well as committing Mexico to continue the reform process it started
in the mid-1980s.  It is clearly in the interests of both countries to manage the response to the
crisis so as to achieve a soft landing for Mexico and a resumption of Mexican growth.  The
existence of NAFTA should facilitate this process, and it is not in the interests of either country
to slow or reverse the integration process under NAFTA. 17
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